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Abstract
Shapley (1953a) introduced the weighted Shapley values as a family of values, also known
as Shapley set. For each exogenously given weight system exists a seperate TU-value.
Shapley (1981) and Dehez (2011), in the context of cost allocation, and Radzik (2012), in
general, presented a value for weighted TU-games that covers the hole family of weighted
Shapley values all at once. To distinguish this value from a weighted Shapley value in
TU-games we call it Shapley set value. This value coincides with a weighted Shapley
value only on a subdomain and allows weights which can depend on coalition functions.
Hammer (1977) and Vasil’ev (1978) introduced independently the Harsanyi set, also
known as selectope (Derks, Haller and Peters, 2000), containing TU-values which are
referred to as Harsanyi-payoffs. These values are obtained by distributing the dividends
from all coalitions by a sharing system that is independent from the coalition function.
In this paper we introduce the Harsanyi set value that, similar to the Shapley set value,
covers the hole family of Harsanyi payoffs at once, allows not exogenously given share
systems and coincides thus also with non linear values on some subdomains. We present
some new axiomatizations of the Shapley set value and the Harsanyi set value containing
a player splitting or a players merging property respectively as a main characterizing
element that recommend these values for profit distribution and cost allocation.
Keywords Cost allocation · Profit distribution · Player splitting · Players merging ·
Shapley set value · Harsanyi set value
1. Introduction
Usually coalition functions don’t exist in a vacuum and in some games there are personal
weights assigned to the players and can change from game to game. For such games
where the weights are given exogenously Shapley (1953a) introduced the weighted Shapley
values. The family of all such TU-values is also known as the Shapley set.
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2But in many cases the weights can also depend on the given coalition functions as
handled in some problems of profit distribution (earnings per share) or cost allocation
(see e. g. Moriarity (1975)). If for example the weights are the singleton worths of the
players one can use the formula of a weighted Shapley value and has to change the weighted
Shapley value for each new coalition function. This was the idea of the ”Independent Cost
Proportional Scheme (ICPS)” in Gangolly (1981). But if you do so you use instead of
a weighted Shapley value a new value, called proportional Shapley Value (Besner 2016;
Be´al et al. 2017; Gangolly 1981) which differ in the axiomatizations from the weighted
Shapley values.
In practice it does not matter if someone uses for calculating a weighted Shapley value,
even though the weights are not given exogenously, but if someone wants to know which
axiomatizations the used value has, for example to argue why a certain value should
be selected, she has to know the right value. Also that the value has to be changed if
the underlying weights are changing is not a convincing argument to choice a value for
calculating. That we can use the same value in cost games and cost saving games or in
profit games and cooperation benefit games in the same situation seems naturally. Here
the Shapley value is significantly superior to proportional variants in TU-games.
All these mentioned lacks do not occur by the Shapley set value (Shapley 1981; Dehez
2011; Radzik 2012) At our knowledge, the first one who gave attention to the fact that
a value regards a coalition function with assigned personally given weights are Shapley
(1981) and Dehez (2011)1. They introduced weighted cost games and presented particu-
lar axiomatizations of a ”weighted value” in this regard in the context of cost allocation.
(Radzik, 2012) formulated this value in general, denoted there by φ∗ and φ0 respectively.
This value is not a TU-value in the originally sense, because it takes into account not
only the coalition function but also players’ weights. Radzik introduced there weighted
coalition functions, defined weighted TU-games and shaped out a value which is axiom-
atized by a relatively large group of axioms which are not logically independent. Then
Radzik called this value also weighted Shapley value, because this value satisfies adapted
well-known axiomatizations of the weighted Shapley values in Nowak and Radzik (1995).
For this value we consider the naming ”weighted Shapley value” as not accurate in some
respects: On the one hand to avoid name conflicts with the weighted Shapley values for
TU-games and here, in our opinion, not the value is weighted, it is the coalition function,
on the other hand this value satisfies different axioms as the weighted Shapley values,
particularly in case of the use of sub domains. Casajus (2017) introduced a huge class
of weighted values ϕω. There the weights are given by a function that can depend on
coalition functions and exogenously given players’ weights in the same time. It turns out
that the Shapley set value covers not only the weighted Shapley values, but also all values
from Casajus’ class on associated sub domains.
The weighted Shapley values are obtained by distributing the dividends by a weight
system where a player owns for each coalition containing her the same weight. Hammer
(1977) and Vasil’ev (1978) introduced the Harsanyi set, also known as selectope (Derks,
Haller and Peters, 2000), a set of TU-values called Harsanyi payoffs. For each player exists
for each coalition containing him a possibly different weight that has to be independent
from the coalition function. In this system of weights, called sharing system, the weights
1Shapley (1981) notes only a comment at an accounting conference that was worked out and proved later
by Dehez (2011).
3of the players for each coalition are not negative, sum up to one and the dividends of the
game have to be distributed between the players according to these weights.
Similar to the Shapley set value we introduce the Harsanyi set value that covers all
Harsanyi payoffs at once and is defined on sharing TU-games which consist of a TU-game
together with a sharing system at a time. This value also coincides on subdomains with
values which are not in the Harsanyi set and the sharing systems can depend on coalition
functions.
In the main part of this paper we introduce axiomatizations of the Shapley set value
and the Harsanyi set value. Within these axiomatizations a player splitting property
and a players merging property play a decisive role and can help to close the gap using
cooperative game theory in profit distribution and cost allocation not only in theory but
also in practice.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains some preliminaries. In section 3
we give two motivating examples. Section 4 presents axioms for the Shapley set value,
give axiomatizations for this value and reveals as a side-benefit a new axiomatization of
the Shapley value. In section 5 we transfer our proceeding with the Shapley set value in
the previous section to the Harsanyi set value. Section 6 summarizes the results and gives
a short conclusion. An appendix (section 7) provides all the proofs and shows logical
independence of the axioms used for axiomatization.
2. Preliminaries
We denote by N the natural numbers, by R the real numbers, by R++ the set of all positive
real numbers and by Q++ the set of all positive rational numbers. Let U be a countably
infinite set, the universe of all players, and denote by N the set of all non-empty and finite
subsets of U. A cooperative game with transferable utility (TU-game) is a pair (N, v)
consisting of a set of players N ∈ N and a coalition function v : 2N → R, v(∅) = 0,
where 2N is the power set of N . We refer to a TU-game also by v. The subsets S ⊆ N are
called coalitions, v(S) is the worth of coalition S and the set of all nonempty subsets
of S is denoted by ΩS. The set of all TU-games with player set N is denoted by V(N)
and, if v({i}) > 0 for all i ∈ N , by V0(N). The restriction of (N, v) to the player set
S ∈ ΩN is denoted by (S, v).
Let N ∈ N , v ∈ V(N) and S ⊆ N . The dividends ∆v(S) (Harsanyi, 1959) are defined
inductively by
∆v(S) :=
{
v(S)−∑R(S ∆v(R), if S ∈ ΩN, and
0, if S = ∅.
A game (N, uS), S ∈ ΩN, with uS(T ) = 1 if S ⊆ T and uS(T ) = 0 otherwise, T ⊆ N ,
is called an unanimity game. It is well-known that any v ∈ V(N) has an unique
presentation
v =
∑
S∈ΩN
∆v(S)uS. (1)
The marginal contribution MCvi (S) of player i ∈ N to S ⊆ N\{i} is given by
MCvi (S) := v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S). Player i ∈ N is called a dummy player if v(S ∪ {i}) =
4v(S)+v({i}), S ⊆ N\{i}; if in addition v({i}) = 0, then i is called a null player; players
i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, are called symmetric in v if v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ {j}), they are called
(mutually) dependent (Nowak and Radzik, 1995) in v if v(S ∪{i}) = v(S) = v(S ∪{j})
and weakly dependent (Besner, 2017a) in v if v(S ∪ {k}) = v(S) + v({k}), k ∈ {i, j},
for all S ⊆ N\{i, j}; a coalition Q ⊆ N is called a partnership (Kalai and Samet, 1987)
in v if v(S ∪ T ) = v(S) for all S ⊆ N\Q and T ( Q.
We define by ΛN := {f : N → R++} with λi := λ(i) for all λ ∈ ΛN, i ∈ N , the collection
of all positive weight systems on N and by ΛNQ := {f : N → Q++} the collection of all
positive rational weight systems on N . Let v ∈ V(N) and λ ∈ ΛN. Then vλ := (λ, v) is
called a weighted coalition function, (N, vλ) or short also vλ is said to be a weighted
TU-game2 (WTU-game), the set of all WTU-games with player set N is denoted by
VΛ(N) if λ ∈ ΛN and by VΛQ(N) if λ ∈ ΛNQ .
The collection ΓN on N of all sharing systems γ ∈ ΓN is given by
ΓN:=
{
γ = (γS,i)S∈ΩN, i∈S
∣∣∣ ∑
i∈S
γS,i = 1 and γS,i ≥ 0 for each S ∈ ΩN and all i ∈ S
}
and the collection ΓNQ on N of all positive rational sharing systems by
ΓNQ :=
{
γ = (γS,i)S∈ΩN, i∈S
∣∣∣ ∑
i∈S
γS,i = 1 and γS,i ∈ Q++ for each S ∈ ΩN and all i ∈ S
}
.
Let v ∈ V(N) and γ ∈ ΓN. Then vγ := (γ, v) is called a sharing coalition function,
(N, vγ) or short also vγ is said to be a sharing TU-game (STU-game), the set of all
STU-games with player set N is denoted by VΓ(N) if γ ∈ ΓN, by VΓQ(N) if γ ∈ ΓNQ and
by VΓ0(N) if γ ∈ ΓN and v ∈ V0(N).
A TU-value ϕ is an operator that assigns to any N ∈ N and v ∈ V(N) a payoff vector
ϕ(N, v) ∈ RN, a weighted TU-value (WTU-value) ϕΛ is an operator that assigns to
any vλ ∈ VΛ(N) a payoff vector ϕΛ(N, vλ) ∈ RN and a sharing TU-value (STU-value)
ϕΓ is an operator that assigns to any vγ ∈ VΓ(N) a payoff vector ϕΓ(N, vγ) ∈ RN.
Let N ∈ N and v ∈ V(N). The (simply) weighted Shapley Value3 Shλ (Shap-
ley, 1953a) is defined by
Shλi (N, v) :=
∑
S⊆N,S3i
λi∑
j∈S λj
∆v(S) for all i ∈ N and λ ∈ Λ. (2)
The Shapley set is the set of all weighted Shapley values. A special case of a weighted
Shapley value, all weights are equal, is the Shapley value Sh (Shapley, 1953b), given by
Shi(N, v) :=
∑
S⊆N,S3i
∆v(S)
|S| for all i ∈ N.
Let v ∈ V0(N). The proportional Shapley Value Shp (Besner 2016; Be´al et al. 2017;
Gangolly 1981) is defined by
Shpi (N, v) :=
∑
S⊆N,S3i
v({i})∑
j∈S v({j})
∆v(S) for all i ∈ N.
2Radzik (2012) called such a game a ”transferable utility weighted game in characteristic function form”.
3We desist from possibly null weights as in Shapley (1953a) or Kalai and Samet (1987)
5As a WTU-value, the Shapley set value ShΛ (Shapley 1981/Dehez 2011; Radzik 2012)4
is defined by
ShΛi (N, v
λ) :=
∑
S⊆N,S3i
λi∑
j∈S λj
∆v(S) for all i ∈ N and vλ ∈ VΛ(N). (3)
The set of the following TU-values is called Harsanyi set (Hammer, 1977; Vasil’ev, 1978),
also known as selectope (Derks, Haller and Peters, 2000), where the payoffs are obtained
by distributing the dividends with the help of a sharing system γ. The TU-values Hγ in
this set, titled Harsanyi payoffs, are defined by
Hγi (N, v) :=
∑
S⊆N,S3i
γS,i∆v(S), γ ∈ ΓN, i ∈ N.
As an STU-value we introduce the Harsanyi set value HΓ defined by
HΓi (N, v
γ) :=
∑
S⊆N,S3i
γS,i∆v(S) for all i ∈ N and vγ ∈ VΓ(N). (4)
3. Profit and cost allocation and motivating examples
A cooperative game with coalition function v represents commonly profits or savings for
all possible coalitions of the player set. Thus in the following we denote by v a profit
game. The profit game is given by a payout function p by
v(S) := p(S)−
∑
i∈S
f({i}) for each S ∈ ΩN, (5)
where f({i}) stands for the (financial) involvement of player i. Another application for
coalition functions are games where the worth of coalitions represent costs. We denote
such cost games by c. Closely related with cost games are cost saving games u which
give the savings obtained by forming coalitions and are defined by
u(S) :=
∑
i∈S
c({i})− c(S) for each S ∈ ΩN.
In addition, similar as cost savings games, we introduce cooperation benefit games q
which are related to profit games v by
q(S) := v(S)−
∑
i∈S
v({i}) for each S ∈ ΩN (6)
and present the profit of cooperating towards to be lone fighters.
E. g., Amer et al., (2007) claim a coherent solution should exist for both cost and saving
(related) problems, so that all players are indifferent between sharing costs and sharing
savings. That means for a player i we should have
ϕi(c) = c({i})− ϕi(u) for all i ∈ N. (7)
4Shapley (1981) and Dehez (2011) denoted this value as ”weighted value” and used it in the context of
cost games, Radzik (2012) denoted this value as ”weighted Shapley value”. We also desist from possibly
null weights.
6In the same sense we should have that players are indifferent between sharing profits and
sharing cooperation benefits
ϕi(v) = v({i}) + ϕi(q) for all i ∈ N. (8)
In the following we give two examples why the usage of the Shapley set value, or, if the
weights of players are in different proportion to each other in some coalitions, the Harsanyi
set value, is recommended in profit and cost allocation instead of a simple TU-values.
3.1. Example for profit allocation
An entrepreneur wants to bridge a short-term need for finance of 50 millions monetary
units (MMU) for one year. He is willing to pay 5 percent interest in this year. Additionally
he wants as few financiers as possible. Thus the deposits must be multiples of 5 millions
and the entrepreneur pays a bonus of 100, 000 if the deposit amounts not less then 30
millions and 500, 000 if the deposit amounts exactly the sum of 50 millions. Therefore we
have a payout function p (in MMU) given by
p(f) :=

1.05f, for 5 ≤ f < 30,
1.05f + 0.1, for 30 ≤ f < 50,
1.1f + 0.5, if f = 50,
(9)
where f is the deposit of a financier under the restriction that f = 5k, k ∈ N.
3.1.1. Situation 1
Three investors, investor A, B and C, will cooperate to obtain a share of the bonus too.
Therefore they must occur as one single financier. A wants to make a involvement about
20 millions, B and C want to invest in each case 16 millions. The investors agree, that in
the case of a consensus how to share the benefits, the investor with the larger investment
possibilities waives the not needed share of the optimal deposit (Table 1).
Table 1: Deposits f (MMU)
S {A} {B} {C} {A,B} {A,C} {B,C} {A,B,C}
f(S) 20 15 15 19+16=35 19+16=35 15+15=30 18+16+16=50
By (9), we establish a payout function p on N = {A,B,C} where the worth of a coalition
S ⊆ N is the payout of the coalition S. By (5), we obtain Table 2 for the related profit
game v and, by (6), Table 3 for the cooperation benefit game q.
Table 2: Profit game v (MMU)
S {A} {B} {C} {A,B} {A,C} {B,C} {A,B,C}
v(S) 1 0.75 0.75 1.85 1.85 1.6 3
7Table 3: Cooperation benefit game q (MMU)
S {A} {B} {C} {A,B} {A,C} {B,C} {A,B,C}
q(S) 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5
The three investors want to use cooperative game theory to share the benefits. B and C
propose at first the Shapley value Sh. But A disagrees. A argues that the Shapley value
prefers players with lower deposits and points to the following situation.
3.1.2. Situation 2
Investor A splits up in two new investors A1 and A2. With investors A1, A2, B and C the
deposits f˜ should be given as shown in Table 4.
Table 4: Deposits f˜ (MMU)
S {A1} {A2} {B} {C} {A1, A2} {A1, B} {A1, C} {A2, B} {A2, C}
f˜(S) 10 10 15 15 10+10=20 10+15=25 10+15=25 10+15=25 10+15=25
S {B,C} {A1, A2, B} {A1, A2, C} {A1, B, C} {A2, B, C} {A1, A2, B, C}
f˜(S) 15+15 9.5+9.5+16=35 9.5+9.5+16=35 10+15+15=40 10+15+15=40 9+9+16+16=50
We have a new payout function p˜ on N˜ = {A1, A2, B, C} and obtain the profit game v˜ in
Table 5 and the cooperation benefit game q˜ given in Table 6.
Table 5: Profit game v˜ (MMU)
S {A1} {A2} {B} {C} {A1, A2} {A1, B} {A1, C} {A2, B} {A2, C}
v˜(S) 0.5 0.5 0.75 0.75 1 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25
S {B,C} {A1, A2, B} {A1, A2, C} {A1, B, C} {A2, B, C} {A1, A2, B, C}
v˜(S) 1.6 1.85 1.85 2.1 2.1 3
Table 6: Cooperation benefit game q˜ (MMU)
S {A1} {A2} {B} {C} {A1, A2} {A1, B} {A1, C} {A2, B} {A2, C}
q˜(S) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
S {B,C} {A1, A2, B} {A1, A2, C} {A1, B, C} {A2, B, C} {A1, A2, B, C}
q˜(S) 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5
Here is a special kind of ”dependency”:
• All coalitions which include both players A1 and A2 have the same worth in v˜ and
q˜ respectively as the related coalitions in v and q which content the player A and
players A1 and A2 spend together in these coalitions the same investment as player
A in the old coalition.
8• In each game the marginal contributions of player A1 or player A2 to any coalition
which does not contain the respective other player are only the singleton worths of
these players.5
• Coalitions which are the same in both situations have the same worth in v/q and v˜/q˜.
In the sum in situation 2 there is no effect by splitting player 1 to the other players. A
argues that the payoff to not splitted players should not change in this case. But this is
not true for the Shapley value (Table 7). So the investors reject the Shapley value. A
Table 7: Profits (MMU)
Investor A A1 A2 B C
Shapley value Sh(v) 1.167 - - 0.917 0.917
Shapley value Sh(v˜) - 0.617 0.617 0.883 0.883
Proportional Shapley value Shp(v) 1.194 - - 0.903 0.903
Proportional Shapley value Shp(v˜) - 0.597 0.597 0.903 0.903
Shapley set value ShΛ(vλ) 1.194 - - 0.903 0.903
Shapley set value ShΛ(v˜λ˜) - 0.597 0.597 0.903 0.903
Harsanyi set value HΓ(vγ) 1.181 - - 0.910 0.910
Harsanyi set value HΓ(v˜γ˜) - 0.590 0.590 0.910 0.910
makes the proposal to use the proportional Shapley value Shp instead that provide the
desired result for profit games.
Now B opposed that also (8) should be satisfied where Shp completely fails. C suggests
a weighted Shapley value Shλ. The Investors agree that the singleton involvements should
be the weights. So they can use formula (2) but they recognize that then the weights are
not given exogenously as required for a weighted Shapley value, the coalition functions
depend on the involvements.
Using the Shapley set value ShΛ they get the same result as by Shp. But now occurs
another problem. Apparently, the investments of the players differ in some coaltions and
so the weights have to be adapted. The investors recognize that they must use a sharing
system γ in the STU-game ({A,B,C}, vγ), given by
γS,i :=
fi(S)
f(S)
,
and a sharing system γ˜ in the in the STU-game
({A1, A2, B, C}, v˜γ˜), given by
γ˜S,i :=
f˜i(S)
f˜(S)
,
where fi(S), f˜i(S) are the respective shares of player i in the deposit of coalition S. But
if they use a Harsanyi payoff Hγ they have the same problem as before by the weighted
Shapley value, the coalition functions and the sharing systems are not independent. Fi-
nally all investors reached a consensus to use the Harsanyi set value HΓ that meets all
requirements and it is easy to verify that also (8) is satisfied.
5Note that players A1 and A2 are dependent in q˜ and weakly dependent in v˜.
93.2. Example for cost allocation
We refer to the example in Besner (2017a). There also the Shapley value Sh fails if
we regard situation 2 after situation 1. The proportional Shapley value Shp gives the
unsplitted players for the cost game in both situations the same payoffs. But if we regard
(7) as a desirable requirement Shp completely fails because in the related cost saving
games the singletons have a worth of zero. A weighted Shapley value Shλ, too, can not
be used because the weights are the singleton worths from the cost game and depend so
on the coalition function. Finally the Shapley set value ShΛ satisfies all requirements we
demand. We get for the cost game the same payoffs as by Shp and it can be easily seen
that the players are indifferent between sharing costs and sharing savings. If there, unlike
as in this example, the weights differ in some coalitions so that we have a sharing system
γ, the Harsanyi set value HΓ is recommended for the usage if γ depends on the coalition
function.
4. The Shapley set value
The set of all weighted Shapley values, also known as Shapley set, requires exogenously
given weights. Shapley (1981) and Dehez (2011), only in the context of cost games,
and Radzik (2012) introduced the Shapley set value together with the related weighted
games. But there is no reference that the weights related to a coalition function can here
depend on it. The naive reader will take to mean that in the mentioned articles there
is just discussed a variety of the weighted Shapley values. The following subsections are
intended to demonstrate that this is not the case.
4.1. Axioms for TU-values
We refer to the following standard axioms for TU-values:
Efficiency, E. For all N ∈ N , v ∈ V(N), we have ∑i∈N ϕi(N, v) = v(N).
Null player, N. For all N ∈ N , v ∈ V(N) and i ∈ N such that i is a null player in v,
we have ϕi(N, v) = 0.
Linearity, L. For all N ∈ N , v, w ∈ V(N) and α ∈ R, we have ϕ(N,αv + w) =
αϕ(N, v) + ϕ(N,w).
Additivity, A. For all N ∈ N , v, w ∈ V(N), we have ϕ(N, v) +ϕ(N,w) = ϕ(N, v+w).
Weighted proportionality, WP (Nowak and Radzik, 1995)6. For all N ∈ N , v ∈
V(N), λ ∈ Λ and i, j ∈ N such that i and j are dependent in v, we have
ϕi(N, v)
λi
=
ϕj(N, v)
λj
.
6This is the essential part of the ω-Mutual Dependence axiom in (Nowak and Radzik, 1995).
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4.2. Radzik’s axioms for WTU-values
Radzik (2012) presented a lot of axioms for WTU-values. For one of these axioms is an
additional player set needed. Thus Radzik introduced for a fixed coalition Q ∈ ΩN a new
player set NQ := (N\Q) ∪ {Q} where Q is regarded as a single player and so {Q} is a
singleton. Then he defined for this player set a new WTU-game, related to the old game.
Definition 4.1. (Radzik, 2012) Let N,NQ ∈ N , Q ∈ ΩN, q := Q if Q is regarded as a
player, NQ := (N\Q) ∪ {q}, (N, vλ) ∈ VΛ(N), (NQ, (vλ)Q) ∈ VΛ(NQ), (vλ)Q := (λQ, vQ)
such that vQ(S) := v(S) and vQ(S ∪ {q}) := v(S ∪Q) for all S ⊆ N\Q and
λQk :=
{
λk, if k ∈ NQ\{q},∑
i∈Q λi if k = q.
Then
(
NQ, (vλ)Q
)
is called a merged players WTU-game7 (MPW-game) to (N, vλ).
The following axioms for WTU-values come from Radzik (2012):
EfficiencyΛ, EΛ. For all N ∈ N , vλ ∈ VΛ(N), we have ∑i∈N ϕΛi (N, vλ) = v(N).
Null playerΛ, NΛ. For all N ∈ N , vλ ∈ VΛ(N) and i ∈ N such that i is a null player
in v, we have ϕΛi (N, v
λ) = 0.
AdditivityΛ (in the coalition function), AΛ. For all N ∈ N , vλ, wλ ∈ VΛ(N), we have
ϕΛ(N, vλ) + ϕΛ(N,wλ) = ϕΛ(N, (v + w)λ).
LinearityΛ (in the coalition function), LΛ. For all N ∈ N , vλ, wλ ∈ VΛ(N) and α ∈ R,
we have ϕΛ(N, (αv + w)λ) = αϕΛ(N, vλ) + ϕΛ(N,wλ).
Weight proportionalityΛ, WPΛQ . For all N ∈ N , vλ ∈ VΛ(N), Q ∈ ΩN such that Q
is a partnership in v and i ∈ Q, we have
ϕΛi (N, v
λ)
λi
= const.
MarginalityΛ (in the coalition function), MΛ. For all N ∈ N , vλ, wλ ∈ VΛ(N) and
i ∈ N such that MCvi (S) = MCwi (S) for all S ⊆ N\{i}, we have ϕΛi (N, vλ) = ϕΛi (N,wλ).
Amalgamating payoffsΛ, APΛ. For all N ∈ N , vλ ∈ VΛ(N), Q ∈ ΩN a partnership in
v, q := Q if Q is regarded as a player and
(
NQ, (vλ)Q
) ∈ VΛ(NQ) an MPW-game to vλ,
we have ∑
i∈Q
ϕΛi (N, v
λ) = ϕΛq
(
NQ, (vλ)Q
)
.
ContinuityΛ, CΛ. For all N ∈ N , vλ ∈ VΛ(N) and α ∈ R, we have ϕΛ(N,αvλ) is a
continuous function of variable α.
Remark 4.2. Note that AΛ, L Λ and M Λ hold only in the coalition function and therefore
only on subdomains. The weight systems must always be equal.
7In Radzik (2012) this game is only mentioned as a reduced game.
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4.3. Additional axioms for WTU-values
Besner (2017a) introduced a corresponding splitted player game for TU-games where a
fixed player is splitted in two new players. In analogy we define a splitted player game
for WTU-games. In difference to the MPW-game, in the splitted player game the new
players are completely independent from the ”splitted” player in the original game apart
from the given properties in the following definition.
Definition 4.3. Let N,N j ∈ N , j ∈ N, N j := (N\{j}) ∪ {k, `}, k, ` ∈ U, k, ` /∈
N, (N, vλ) ∈ VΛ(N), (N j, (vλ)j) ∈ VΛ(N j), (vλ)j := (λj, vj). The game (N j, (vλ)j) is
called a splitted player WTU-game (SPW-game) to (N, vλ) if for all S ⊆ N\{j}
• λjk + λj` = λj and λji = λi if i ∈ N\{j},
• vj(S ∪ {m}) = v(S) if m ∈ {k, `},
• vj(S ∪ {k, l}) = v(S ∪ {j}) and
• vj(S) = v(S).
Remark 4.4. Regard that the worths of vj(k) and vj(`) are zero and the players k, ` are
dependent in the game vj. Like as the null player property can be strengthened to the
dummy player property we can strengthen definition 4.3 to a definition where the players
k, ` are weakly dependent in the game vj and so vj(S ∪ {m}) = v(S) + vj({m}) as in
example 3.1.2, situation 2, for the profit game.
In the following we present additional axioms for WTU-values:
Equal weighted symmetryΛ, EWSΛ (Shapley, 1981). For all N ∈ N , vλ ∈
VΛ(N), i, j ∈ N such that i and j are symmetric in v and λi = λj, we have
ϕΛi (N, v
λ) = ϕΛj (N, v
λ).
Null player outΛ 8, NOΛ. For all N ∈ N , vλ ∈ VΛ(N) and j ∈ N such that j is a null
player in v, we have ϕΛi (N, v
λ) = ϕΛi (N\{j}, vλ) for all i ∈ N\{j}.
Weighted proportionalityΛ, WPΛ. For all N ∈ N , vλ ∈ VΛ(N) and i, j ∈ N such
that i and j are dependent in v, we have
ϕΛi (N, v
λ)
λi
=
ϕΛj (N, v
λ)
λj
.
Players mergingΛ, PMΛ. For all N ∈ N , vλ ∈ VΛ(N), k, ` ∈ N two dependent players
in v and
(
N{k,`}, (vλ){k,`}
) ∈ VΛ(N{k,`}) an MPW-game to (N, vλ), we have
ϕΛi (N, v
λ) = ϕΛi
(
N{k,`}, (vλ){k,`}
)
for all i ∈ N\{k, `}.
Player splittingΛ, PSΛ. For all N ∈ N , vλ ∈ VΛ(N), j ∈ N and (N j, (vλ)j) ∈ VΛ(N j)
an SPW-game to (N, vλ), we have
ϕΛi (N, v
λ) = ϕΛi
(
N j, (vλ)j
)
for all i ∈ N\{j}.
8This axiom is part of the dummy elimination axiom in (Shapley, 1981) and comes as a TU-axiom from
(Derks and Haller, 1999).
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Weighted standardnessΛ, WSΛ. For all N ∈ N , |N | = 2, vλ ∈ VΛ(N) and i, j ∈
N, i 6= j, we have
ϕΛi (N, v
λ) = v({i}) + λi
λi + λj
[
v({i, j})− v({i})− v({j})].
Remark 4.5. It is easy to see that WPΛQ is equivalent to WP
Λ. Hereafter, we use only
the shortcut WP Λ.
The players merging and the player splitting property both pick up the idea in Banker
(1981) that splitting up a cost center or merging cost centers should not change the
allocation of costs to the remaining cost centers. The procedure of amalgamating players
in the amalgamating payoffs axiom can be interpreted as a form of adapting the idea in
Lehrer (1988) that the new players get together the same payoff as the old splitted player.
Here Lehrer’s idea is satisfied too if the WTU-value is efficient.
Remark 4.6. Let N ∈ N , vλ ∈ VΛ(N), j ∈ N and (N j, (vλ)j) ∈ VΛ(N j) a SPW-game
to (N, vλ). If ϕΛ is a WTU-value that satisfies E Λ and PS Λ, then we have
ϕΛk
(
N j, (vλ)j
)
+ ϕΛ`
(
N j, (vλ)j
)
= ϕΛj (N, v
λ) for k, ` ∈ N j, k, ` /∈ N.
4.4. Subdomains
Any TU-value ignores weights which potentially are allocated to the players. Thus we
can interpret each TU-value also as a WTU-value:
Remark 4.7. Let N ∈ N and vλ ∈ VΛ(N). Each TU-value ϕ coincides with a WTU-
value ϕΛ by ϕΛi (N, v
λ) := ϕi(N, v) for all i ∈ N, in particular we have for a weighted
Shapley value Shλ
k
, λk ∈ Λ, (Shλki )Λ(N, vλ) := Shλki (N, v) for all i ∈ N.
At first glance the Shapley set value looks very similar to a weighted Shapley value. But
for one thing, we have only one value for all weight systems λ, whereas the weight system
used in a weighted Shapley value is fixed, and secondly, for some λ the weights can depend
on the coalition function and are therefore not endogenous given as required for a weighted
Shapley value. For different subdomains this value coincides with different values.
Remark 4.8. Let λ′ ∈ Λ and VΛλ′ (N) the set of all WTU-games (N, vλ) ∈ VΛ(N) with
λ := λ′. ShΛ coincides on VΛλ′ (N) with Shλ′.
But the Shapley set value coincides on some subdomains also with non-linear values like
the proportional Shapley value.
Remark 4.9. For all v ∈ V0(N) let λv ∈ Λ such that λvi := v({i}) for all i ∈ N and
let VΛλv (N) the set of all WTU-games (N, vλ) ∈ VΛ(N) with λ := λv. ShΛ coincides on
VΛλv (N) with Shp.
Casajus (2017) presented a huge class of solutions ϕω, ω ∈ Ω, Ω := {f : R× U→ R++},
given by
ϕωi (N, v) :=
∑
S⊆N,S3i
ω(v({i}), i)∑
j∈S ω(v({j}), j)
∆v(S) for all i ∈ N and v ∈ V(N).
With the weight functions ω ∈ Ω we can generalize the previous two remarks.
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Remark 4.10. Let ω ∈ Ω, λωv ∈ Λ such that λωvi := ω(v({i}), i) for all i ∈ N and all
v ∈ V(N) such that v({i}) is in the domain of ω for all i ∈ N and let VΛλωv(N) the set
of all WTU-games (N, vλ) ∈ VΛ(N) with λ := λωv. ShΛ coincides on VΛλωv(N) with ϕω.
4.5. Additivity can replace linearity
Among other axiomatizations Radzik presented the following one.
Theorem 4.11. (Radzik, 2012) ShΛ is the unique WTU-value that satisfies E Λ, LΛ, N Λ
and WP Λ.
In remark 4.6 in Radzik (2012) is pointed out that LΛ can be weakened to AΛ if we replace
LΛ by AΛ and add CΛ. But this is not necessary what the following theorem and the
next corollary are showing.
Theorem 4.12. (Besner, 2017b) Shλ is the unique TU-value that satisfies E, N, WP
and A.
This axiomatization is a special case of theorem 6.4 in Besner (2017b). Since there the
proof is oriented on level structures we give a short proof in the appendix 7.1.
By theorem 4.12 and remark 4.8 we have the following corollary.
Corollary 4.13. ShΛ is the unique WTU-value that satisfies E Λ, N Λ, WP Λ and AΛ.
4.6. Insertion
We introduce a special case of the weighted proportionality property.
Dependency, D. For all N ∈ N , v ∈ V(N) and i, j ∈ N such that i and j are dependent
in v, we have ϕi(N, v) = ϕj(N, v).
By theorem 4.12 we obtain the following corollary for the Shapley value.
Corollary 4.14. Sh is the unique TU-value that satisfies E, N, D and A.
This axiomatization is weaker then the well-known axiomatization in Shapley (1953b) by
efficiency, symmetry, additivity and the null player property because symmetry implies
dependency but not vice versa.
4.7. Player splitting
In our example, subsection 3.1.2, situation 2, the game q˜ is an SPW-game to the game q
in situation 1. If we use the stronger version of an SPW-game as mentioned in remark 4.4
this holds also for the profit game v. The payoff to unchanged players calculated by the
Shapley set value ShΛ is in situation 2 the same as in situation 1 as required in PSΛ. Using
the weaker version of an SPW-game (definition 4.3) we show that ShΛ satisfies PSΛ in
general what could with less effort also be shown for the stronger version.
Lemma 4.15. ShΛ satisfies PS Λ.
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For the proof see appendix 7.2. The following lemma shows dependence on EWSΛ for
efficient values which satisfy PSΛ.
Lemma 4.16. Let N ∈ N and vλ ∈ VΛ(N). If a WTU-value ϕΛ satisfies E Λ and PS Λ
then ϕΛ satisfies also EWS Λ.
For the proof see appendix 7.3. The next lemma makes use of lemma 4.16 in the proof.
Lemma 4.17. Let N ∈ N and vλ ∈ VΛQ(N). If a WTU-value ϕΛ satisfies E Λ and PS Λ
then ϕΛ satisfies also WP Λ.
For the proof see appendix 7.4. We obtain by lemma 4.15, lemma 4.17 and corollary 4.13
the following corollary.
Corollary 4.18. Let N ∈ N and vλ ∈ VΛQ(N). ShΛ is the unique WTU-value that
satisfies E Λ, N Λ, PS Λ and AΛ.
In Radzik (2012) is also presented the following axiomatization.
Theorem 4.19. (Radzik, 2012) ShΛ is the unique WTU-value that satisfies E Λ, M Λ and
WP Λ.
By lemma 4.17 and theorem 4.19 we get another corollary.
Corollary 4.20. Let N ∈ N and vλ ∈ VΛQ(N). ShΛ is the unique WTU-value that
satisfies E Λ, PS Λ and M Λ.
Remark 4.21. Lemma 4.17 holds for vλ ∈ VΛ(N) if we require continuity of ϕΛ in λ for
all λ ∈ ΛN in an additional axiom. Thus also corollary 4.18 and corollary 4.20 are valid
for vλ ∈ VΛ(N) if there is is in each case an additional continuity axiom.
4.8. Players merging
The Shapley set value and the players merging property fit together well.
Lemma 4.22. ShΛ satisfies PM Λ.
Since it is easy to adapt the proof from lemma 4.15 the proof is omitted. It follows an
axiomatization which uses the players merging property.
Theorem 4.23. ShΛ is the unique WTU-value that satisfies NO Λ, PM Λ, WS Λ and AΛ.
For the proof see appendix 7.5.
5. The Harsanyi set value
The Harsanyi payoffs Hγ need a sharing system that is exogenously given. If the sharing
system depends on the coalition function we can use the Harsanyi set value HΓ.
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5.1. Axioms for STU-values
To transfer axioms for WTU-values into axioms for STU-values we need two definitions
we already know as definitions in the version for WTU-values.
Definition 5.1. Let N,NQ ∈ N , Q ∈ ΩN, q := Q if Q is regarded as a player, NQ :=
(N\Q) ∪ {q}, (N, vγ) ∈ VΓ(N), (NQ, (vγ)Q) ∈ VΓ(NQ), (vγ)Q := (γQ, vQ) such that
vQ(S) := v(S) and vQ(S ∪ {q}) := v(S ∪Q) for all S ⊆ N\Q and
γQS,k :=

γS,k, if S ∈ N\Q and k ∈ S,
γT∪Q,k, if S = T ∪ {q}, T ⊆ N\Q and k ∈ T,∑
i∈Q γT∪Q,i if S = T ∪ {q}, T ⊆ N\Q and k = q.
Then
(
NQ, (vγ)Q
)
is called an merged players STU-game(MPS-game) to (N, vγ).
Definition 5.2. Let N,N j ∈ N , j ∈ N, N j := (N\{j}) ∪ {k, `}, k, ` ∈ U, k, ` /∈
N, (N, vγ) ∈ VΓ(N), (N j, (vγ)j) ∈ VΓ(N j), (vγ)j := (γj, vj). The game (N j, (vγ)j)
is called a splitted player STU-game (SPS-game) to (N, vγ) if for all
S ⊆ N\{j}, i ∈ S, m ∈ {k, `},
• γjS,i = γS,i, γjS∪{k,`},k + γjS∪{k,`},` = γS∪{j},j and γjS∪{k,`},i = γS∪{j},i,
• vj(S ∪ {m}) = v(S),
• vj(S ∪ {k, l}) = v(S ∪ {j}) and
• vj(S) = v(S).
Remark 5.3. Note that the shares of all players from a coalition (S∪{m}) that contains
only one splitted player are arbitrary within the domain of a sharing system.
Remark 5.4. Regard that the worths of vj(k) and vj(`) are zero and k, ` are dependent
in vj. Like as the null player property can be strengthened to the dummy property we can
strengthen definition 5.2 to a definition where the players k, ` are weakly dependent in the
game vj and so vj(S ∪ {m}) = v(S) + vj({m}) as in example 3.1.2, situation 2.
Our axioms for STU-values are simple adaptions of the related axioms for WTU-values.
EfficiencyΓ, EΓ. For all N ∈ N , vγ ∈ VΓ(N), we have ∑i∈N ϕΓi (N, vγ) = v(N).
Null player outΓ, NOΓ. For all N ∈ N , vγ ∈ VΓ(N) and j ∈ N such that j is a null
player in v, we have ϕΓi (N, v
γ) = ϕΓi (N\{j}, vγ) for all i ∈ N\{j}.
AdditivityΓ(in the coalition function), AΓ. For all N ∈ N , vγ, wγ ∈ VΓ(N), we have
ϕΓ(N, vγ) + ϕΓ(N,wγ) = ϕΓ(N, (v + w)γ).
Players mergingΓ, PMΓ. For all N ∈ N , vγ ∈ VΓ(N), k, ` ∈ N two dependent
players in v and
(
N{k,`}, (vγ){k,`}
) ∈ VΓ(N{k,`}) an MPS-game to (N, vγ), we have
ϕΓi (N, v
γ) = ϕΓi
(
N{k,`}, (vγ){k,`}
)
for all i ∈ N\{k, `}.
Player splittingΓ, PSΓ. For all N ∈ N , vγ ∈ VΓ(N), j ∈ N and (N j, (vγ)j) ∈ VΓ(N j)
an SPS-game to (N, vγ), we have ϕΓi (N, v
γ) = ϕΓi
(
N j, (vγ)j
)
for all i ∈ N\{j}.
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Weighted standardnessΓ, WSΓ. For all N ∈ N , |N | = 2, vγ ∈ VΓ(N) and i, j ∈ N, i 6=
j, we have
ϕΓi (N, v
γ) = v({i}) + γN,i
γN,i + γN,j
[
v({i, j})− v({i})− v({j})].
5.2. Subdomains
Similar to the WTU-values we can interpret each TU-value also as an STU-value:
Remark 5.5. Let N ∈ N and vγ ∈ VΓ(N). Each TU-value ϕ coincides with an STU-
value ϕΓ by ϕΓi (N, v
γ) := ϕi(N, v) for all i ∈ N, in particular we have for a Harsanyi
payoff Hγ
k
, γk ∈ Γ, (Hγki )Γ(N, vγ) := Hγ
k
i (N, v) for all i ∈ N.
Also the Harsanyi set value looks very similar to a Harsanyi payoff. But for one thing,
we have only one value for all sharing systems γ, whereas the sharing system used in a
Harsanyi payoff is fixed, and secondly, for some γ the sharing systems can also depend on
the coalition function and are therefore not endogenous given as required for a Harsanyi
payoff again. For different subdomains this value coincides with different values.
Remark 5.6. Let γ′ ∈ ΓN and VΓγ′(N) the set of all STU-games (N, vγ) ∈ VΓ(N) with
γ := γ′. HΓ coincides on VΓγ′ (N) with the Harsanyi payoff Hγ′.
Remark 5.7. Let λ ∈ ΛN and γ′ ∈ ΓN such that
γ′T,i :=
λi∑
j∈T λj
, T ∈ ΩN, i ∈ T,
and let VΓγ′(N) the set of all STU-games (N, vγ) ∈ VΓ(N) with γ := γ′. HΓ coincides on
VΓγ′ (N) with the weighted Shapley value Shλ.
Remark 5.8. For all λ ∈ ΛN let γλ ∈ ΓN such that
γλT,i :=
λi∑
j∈T λj
, T ∈ ΩN, i ∈ T,
ΓΛ(N) := {γλ : λ ∈ ΛN} and let VΓΛ(N) the set of all STU-games (N, vγ) ∈ VΓ(N) with
γ ∈ ΓΛ(N). HΓ coincides on VΓΛ(N) with the Shapley set value ShΛ.
Also the Harsanyi set value coincides with non-linear values on some subdomains9.
Remark 5.9. Let v ∈ V0(N) and γv ∈ ΓN such that
γvT,i :=
v({i})∑
j∈T v({j})
, T ∈ ΩN, i ∈ T,
and let VΓγv0 (N) the set of all STU-games (N, vγ) ∈ VΓ0(N) with γ := γv. HΓ coincides on
VΓγv0 (N) with the proportional Shapley value Shp.
9Easily can be shown that the Harsanyi set value also coincides on certain subdomains with non-linear
values for level structures presented in Besner (2018), with the proportional Shapley support levels value,
the proportional Shapley alliance levels value and the proportional Shapley collaboration levels value.
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5.3. Axiomatizations
Lemma 5.10. HΓ satisfies E Γ, NO Γ, PS Γ, PM Γ, WS Γ and AΓ.
For the proof see appendix 7.6. In difference to corollary 4.18, the next theorem needs
the null player out property instead of the null player property.
Theorem 5.11. Let N ∈ N and vγ ∈ VΓQ(N). HΓ is the unique WTU-value that
satisfies E Γ, NO Γ, PS Γ and AΓ.
For the proof see appendix 7.7.
Remark 5.12. Similar to remark 4.21 theorem 5.11 holds for vγ ∈ VΓ(N) if we require
continuity of ϕΓ in γ for all γ ∈ ΓN in an additional axiom.
Our last axiomatization can be transferred from theorem 4.23 one to one.
Theorem 5.13. Let N ∈ N and vγ ∈ VΓ(N). HΓ is the unique WTU-value that satisfies
NO Γ, PM Γ, WS Γ and AΓ.
The proof is omitted because it can also be transmitted one to one from theorem 4.23.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we have carved out the differences between the weighted Shapley values and
the Shapley set value and the differences between the Harsanyi payoffs and the Harsanyi
set value. The introduced player splitting and players melting properties lead to convinc-
ing axiomatizations, particularly in the context of profit and cost allocation. Especially
the axiomatizations of the Harsanyi set value, not using any dividends, astonish through
their practicable presentation.
It is immediate, besides the given axiomatizations in Radzik (2012) and Shapley
(1981)/Dehez (2011), that the Shapley set value also satisfies adaptions for WTU-values
from the well-known axiomatizations of the weighted Shapley values given in Myerson
(1980)\Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) by efficiency and weighted balanced contributions
and Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) by consistency and weighted standardness.
Also the amalgamating payoffs property allows interesting axiomatizations. Whereas in
the axiomatization in Radzik (2012, theorem 2.1) APΛ is redundant, it is clear, applying
ideas from the proof of theorem 4.23, that ShΛ (HΓ) can be axiomatized by EΛ, NOΛ,
APΛ, WSΛ and AΛ (EΓ, NOΓ, APΓ, WSΓ and AΓ). Here APΛ is not redundant. Look
for this, e. g., to the WTU-value ϕ, defined by
ϕi(N, v
λ) =
∑
S⊆N,
S3i, |S|≤2
λi∑
j∈S λj
∆v(S) +
∑
S⊆N,
S3i, |S|≥3
∆v(S)
|S| for all i ∈ N,
that satisfies EΛ, NOΛ, WSΛ and AΛ and doesn’t match APΛ. But it is still an open
question if all axioms are logically independent.
We have desisted from possibly null weights for the Shapley set value. If one wants to
allow null weights we recommend to use the Harsanyi set value. There one has to specify
the weights for coalitions where in the Shapley set value all players have a weight of zero
how to share in this case the dividend of these coalitions.
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7. Appendix
Lemma 7.1. (Besner, 2017b) Players i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, are dependent in v ∈ V(N), iff
∆v(S ∪ {k}) = 0, k ∈ {i, j}, for all S ⊆ N\{i, j}.
7.1. Proof of theorem 4.12
Let vλ ∈ VΛ(N). It is well-known that Shλ satisfies all axioms from theorem 4.12. So,
due to property (1) and A, it is sufficient to show that ϕ is uniquely defined on games
vS := ∆v(S) · uS, S ∈ ΩN.
Let S ∈ ΩN arbitrary and ϕ a value that satisfies all axioms from theorem 4.12. All
players j ∈ N\S are null players in vS and so ϕ is unique on vS for all j ∈ N\S by N.
Thus, if S is a singleton, ϕ is unique on vS by E. Let now |S| ≥ 2. By lemma 7.1 all i ∈ S
are dependent in vS and therefore, by E and WP, ϕ is also unique on vS for all i ∈ N .
7.2. Proof of lemma 4.15
Let vλ ∈ VΛ(N), j ∈ N and (N j, (vλ)j) an SPW-game to (N, vλ). We point out that we
have for all S ∈ ΩN\{j}, ∆vj(S) = ∆v(S), ∆vj(S∪{k, l}) = ∆v(S∪{j}) and, by lemma 7.1,
∆vj(S ∪ {k}) = ∆vj(S ∪ {`}) = 0. Then we get for all i ∈ N\{j}
ShΛi (N, v
λ) =
(3)
∑
R⊆N,R3i
λi∑
m∈R λm
∆v(R)
=
∑
S⊆N\{j}, S3i
λi∑
m∈S λm
∆v(S) +
∑
S⊆N\{j}, S3i
λi∑
m∈S∪{j} λm
∆v(S ∪ {j})
=
∑
S⊆Nj\{k,`},
S3i
λji∑
m∈S λ
j
m
∆vj(S) +
∑
S⊆Nj\{k,`},
S3i
λji∑
m∈S∪{k,`} λ
j
m
∆vj(S ∪ {k, `})
=
∑
R⊆Nj, R3i
λji∑
m∈R λ
j
m
∆vj(R) = Sh
Λ
i
(
N j, (vλ)j
)
.
7.3. Proof of lemma 4.16
Let N = {1, 2, ..., n} ∈ N , n ≥ 2, vλ ∈ VΛ(N), ϕΛ a WTU-value that satisfies EΛ
and PSΛ and, w.l.o.g., player 1 and player 2 symmetric in v with λ1 = λ2. We split
player 1, according to PSΛ, into two new players, player n + 1 and player n + 2, N1 :=
{2, 3, ..., n, n+ 1, n+ 2} and obtain
ϕΛ2
(
N1, (vλ)1
)
= ϕΛ2 (N, v
λ), (10)
and, if we split player 2, according to PSΛ, into the same players as before, player n+ 1
and player n+ 2, instead, N2 := {1, 3, 4, ..., n, n+ 1, n+ 2}, we have
ϕ1
(
N2, (vλ)2
)
= ϕ1(N, v
λ), (11)
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where we choose λ2n+1 := λ
1
n+1 := λ
2
n+2 := λ
1
n+2.
In the same manner we split now in the game
(
N1, (vλ)1
)
player 2 into two new players,
player n+3 and player n+4, and analogous in the game
(
N2, (vλ)2
)
player 1 into the same
players as before, player n+3 and player n+4, and choose λ2
1
n+3 := λ
12
n+3 := λ
21
n+4 := λ
12
n+4.
We have N1
2
= N2
1
= {3, 4, ..., n, n+ 1, n+ 2, n+ 3, n+ 4} and (vλ)12 = (vλ)21 and get
by EΛ, according to remark 4.6,
ϕn+3
(
N1
2
, (vλ)1
2
)
+ ϕn+4
(
N1
2
, (vλ)1
2
)
= ϕ2
(
N1, (vλ)1
)
=
(10)
ϕ2(N, v
λ),
ϕn+3
(
N2
1
, (vλ)2
1
)
+ ϕn+4
(
N2
1
, (vλ)2
1
)
= ϕ1
(
N2, (vλ)2
)
=
(11)
ϕ1(N, v
λ)
and hence ϕ1(N, v
λ) = ϕ2(N, v
λ) and EWSΛ is shown.
7.4. Proof of lemma 4.17
Let N ∈ N , |N | ≥ 2, vλ ∈ VΛQ(N), ϕΛ a WTU-value that satisfies EΛ and PSΛ and
therefore, by lemma 4.16, also EWSΛ and i, j ∈ N such that i and j are dependent in v.
Due to λi, λj ∈ Q++ the weights λk, k ∈ {i, j}, can be written as a fraction
λk =
pk
qk
with pk, qk ∈ N.
We choose a main denominator q of these two fractions by q := qiqj. With zi := piqj and
zj := pjqi we get
λi =
zi
q
and λj =
zj
q
. (12)
Applying PSΛ (repeatedly) to (N, vλ) and the two players i, j we can get the WTU-
game (N ′, (vλ)′) where each player k, k ∈ {i, j}, is splitted in zk players k1 to k(zk), such
that N ′ = (N\{i, j}) ∪ {im : 1 ≤ m ≤ zi} ∪ {jm : 1 ≤ m ≤ zj} and each player
km ∈ N ′\(N\{i, j}), 1 ≤ m ≤ zk, get a singleton worth v′({km}) := 0 for k ∈ {i, j}, with
a weight λkm :=
1
q
where
∣∣N ′\(N\{i, j})∣∣ = z1 + z2.
All players ` ∈ N ′\(N\{i, j}) are symmetric in v′ and have the same weights. Hence
follows by EWSΛ and EΛ
ϕ`(N
′, (vλ)′) =
ϕi(N, v
λ) + ϕj(N, v
λ)
zi + zj
for ` ∈ N ′\(N\{i, j}). (13)
We get
ϕk(N, v
λ) =
(13)
∑
1≤m≤zk
ϕkm(N
′, (vλ)′) =
zk
zi + zj
[
ϕi(N, v
λ) + ϕj(N, v
λ)
]
for k ∈ {i, j}.
It follows
ϕi(N, v) =
zi
zj
ϕj(N, v
λ) =
(12)
λi
λj
ϕj(N, v)
and WPΛ is shown.
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7.5. Proof of theorem 4.23
Let vλ ∈ VΛ(N). By (3), lemma 4.22 and Radzik (2012), it is clear that ShΛ satisfies all
axioms from theorem 4.23. Thus we have only to show uniqueness.
Let ϕ a value that satisfies all axioms from theorem 4.23. If |N | = 2, ϕ is unique on vλ
by WSΛ. Let now one player i ∈ N a null player. Then, by NOΛ, ϕ is unique on ({j}, vλ)
for the other player j ∈ N , but then also for |N | = 1 in general.
Let now |N | ≥ 3. Due to property (1) and AΛ, it is sufficient to show that ϕ is uniquely
defined on games vλS with vS := ∆v(S) · uS, S ∈ ΩN.
Let S ∈ ΩN, S 6= N . By lemma 7.1, all j ∈ S are dependent in vS and all k ∈ N\S are
null players in vS. If we delete, by NO
Λ, all but one null player k ∈ N\S and merge all
players j ∈ S by PMΛ, step by step, we get, by WSΛ, that ϕ is unique on vλS for the null
player k and since k was arbitrary, that ϕ is unique on vλS for all null players k ∈ N\S.
Now we delete all null players k ∈ N\S or we have S = N . By NOΛ, we have
ShΛj (S, v
λ) = ShΛj (N, v
λ) for all j ∈ S. If |S| = 1, ϕ is unique on vλS as shown above.
Let now |S| ≥ 2 and i ∈ S. We merge all players j ∈ S\{i} by PMΛ, step by step,
and obtain ϕΛi (N, v
λ
S) = ϕ
Λ
i
(
SS\{i}, (vλS)
S\{i}). By WSΛ, ϕΛi (SS\{i}, (vλS)S\{i}) is unique on
(vλS)
S\{i}. Therefore ϕΛi (N, v
λ
S) is unique on v
λ
S. Since i ∈ S was arbitrary, ϕΛ is unique
for all i ∈ S and theorem 4.23 is shown.
7.6. Proof of lemma 5.10
Obviously, by (4), HΓ satisfies EΓ, NOΓ, WSΓ and AΓ.
We show that HΓ meets PSΓ. The proof is similar to the proof of lemma 4.15. Let
vγ ∈ VΓ(N), j ∈ N and (N j, (vγ)j) an SPS-game to (N, vγ). We point out that we have
for all S ∈ ΩN\{j}, ∆vj(S) = ∆v(S), ∆vj(S ∪ {k, l}) = ∆v(S ∪ {j}) and, by lemma 7.1,
∆vj(S ∪ {k}) = ∆vj(S ∪ {`}) = 0. Then we get for all i ∈ N\{j}
HΓi (N, v
γ) =
(4)
∑
R⊆N,R3i
γR,i∆v(R) =
∑
S⊆N\{j}, S3i
γS,i∆v(S) +
∑
S⊆N\{j}, S3i
γS,i∆v(S ∪ {j})
=
∑
S⊆Nj\{k,`}, S3i
γjS,i∆vj(S) +
∑
S⊆Nj\{k,`}, S3i
γjS∪{k,`},i∆vj(S ∪ {k, `})
=
∑
R⊆Nj, R3i
γjR,i∆vj(R) = H
Γ
i
(
N j, (vγ)j
)
.
Since it is easy to adapt this part of the proof to show also that HΓ meets PMΓ we have
omitted this adaption.
7.7. Proof of theorem 5.11
Let vγ ∈ VΓQ(N). By lemma 5.10, due to property (1) and A, it is sufficient to show that
ϕ is uniquely defined on games vS := ∆v(S) · uS, S ∈ ΩN.
Let S ∈ ΩN arbitrary and ϕ a value that satisfies all axioms from theorem 4.12. It
is obvious that EΓ and NOΓ imply together NΓ. Thus ϕ also satisfies NΓ. All players
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j ∈ N\S are null players in vS and so ϕ is unique on vS for all j ∈ N\S by N. So, by
NOΓ, it is sufficient to show that ϕ is unique on games v¯S := (S, vS).
Let γ′ ∈ ΓNQ such that
γ′T,i :=
γS,i∑
j∈T γS,j
, T ∈ ΩS, i ∈ T.
We show that
ϕΓi (S, v
γ′) = ϕΓi (S, v
γ) for all i ∈ S. (14)
If |S| ≤ 2, we have γ′ = γ and (14) is satisfied. Let now |S| ≥ 3, i ∈ S and Q ∈ N , Q :=
{i, q}, q /∈ N . Accordingly to PSΓ, we split (possibly repeatedly), the player q into all
other players j ∈ S\{i}. By remark 5.3, we finally can obtain both games (S, vγ′) and
(S, vγ) and get, by PSΓ, ϕΓi (S, v
γ′) = ϕΓi (S, v
γ) for all i ∈ S since i was arbitrary.
But then coincides ϕΓ on (S, vγ) also with an WTU-value ϕΛ on (S, vλ) ∈ VΛ(S) with
λi := γS,i for all i ∈ S that satisfies EΛ, NΛ, PSΛ and AΛ. Therefore, by corollary 4.18,
ϕΓ is unique on vS and theorem 5.11 is shown.
7.8. Logical independence
Finally, we want to show the independence of the axioms used in the axiomatizations.
Remark 7.2. Let vλ ∈ VΛQ(N), N ∈ N . The axioms in corollary 4.20 are logically inde-
pendent:
• E Λ: The WTU-value ϕ, defined by ϕi(N, vλ) := 0 for all i ∈ N , satisfies PS Λ and
M Λ but not E Λ.
• PS Λ: The WTU-value ϕ, defined by
ϕi(N, v
λ) :=
∑
S⊆N,S3i
1
|S|∆v(S) for all i ∈ N,
satisfies E Λ and M Λ but not PS Λ.
• M Λ: The WTU-value ϕ, defined by
ϕi(N, v
λ) :=
λi∑
j∈N λj
v(N) for all i ∈ N,
satisfies E Λ and PS Λ but not M Λ.
Remark 7.3. Let vλ ∈ VΛQ(N), N ∈ N . The axioms in corollary 4.18 are logically inde-
pendent:
• E Λ: The WTU-value ϕ, defined by ϕi(N, vλ) := 0 for all i ∈ N , satisfies
N Λ\NO Λ,PS Λ and AΛ but not E Λ.
• N Λ\NO Λ: The WTU-value ϕ, defined by
ϕi(N, v
λ) =
λi∑
j∈N λj
v(N) for all i ∈ N,
satisfies E Λ,PS Λ and AΛ but not N Λ\NO Λ.
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• PS Λ: The WTU-value ϕ, defined by
ϕi(N, v
λ) =
∑
S⊆N,S3i
1
|S|∆v(S) for all i ∈ N,
satisfies E Λ,N Λ\NO Λ and AΛ but not PS Λ.
• AΛ: The WTU-value ϕ, defined for all i ∈ N by
ϕi(N, v
λ) =

0, if i is a null player in v,
λi∑
j∈N,
j is no null player in v
λj
v(N), else,
satisfies E Λ,N Λ\NO Λ and PS Λ but not AΛ.
Remark 7.4. Let vλ ∈ VΛ(N), N ∈ N . The axioms in theorem 4.23 are logically inde-
pendent:
• NO Λ: The WTU-value ϕ, defined for all i ∈ N by
ϕi(N, v
λ) :=

0, if |N | = 1,∑
S⊆N,
S3i
λi∑
j∈S λj
∆v(S), else,
satisfies PM Λ,WS Λ and AΛ but not NO Λ.
• PM Λ: The WTU-value ϕ, defined by
ϕi(N, v
λ) =
∑
S⊆N,
S3i, |S|≤2
λi∑
j∈S λj
∆v(S) for all i ∈ N,
satisfies NO Λ,WS Λ and AΛ but not PM Λ.
• WS Λ: The WTU-value ϕ, defined by ϕi(N, vλ) := 0 for all i ∈ N , satisfies
NO Λ,PM Λ and AΛ but not WS Λ.
• AΛ: Let R := {i ∈ N : i is no null player in v}. The WTU-value ϕ, defined for all
i ∈ N by
ϕi(N, v
λ) =
v({i}), if i ∈ N\R or |N | = 1 or |R| = 1,v({i}) + λi∑
j∈R λj
∆v(R), else,
satisfies NO Λ,PM Λ and WS Λ but not AΛ.
It is easy to transfer our considerations for logical independence above to STU-games and
STU-values. We obtain the following remark.
Remark 7.5. The axioms in theorem 5.11 and in theorem 5.13 are logically independent.
23
References
Amer, R., Carreras, F., & Magan˜a, A. (2007). Two Main Methods for Utility Sharing in Joint Business:
A Discussion. Journal of Mathematics and Statistics 3 (1), 28–35.
Banker, R. D. (1981). Equity Considerations in Traditional Full Cost Allocation Practices: An Ax-
iomatic Perspective. Carnegie-Mellon University.
Besner, M. (2016). Lo¨sungskonzepte kooperativer Spiele mit Koalitionsstrukturen. Master’s thesis, Fern-
Universita¨t Hagen, Germany.
Besner, M. (2017a). Axiomatizations of the proportional Shapley value.
Besner, M. (2017b). Weighted Shapley levels values.
Besner, M. (2018). Proportional Shapley levels values.
Be´al, S., Ferrie`res, S., Re´mila, E., & Solal, P. (2017). The proportional Shapley value and applications.
Games and Economic Behavior.
Casajus, A. (2017). Weakly balanced contributions and solutions for cooperative games. Operations Re-
search Letters, 45, 616–619.
Dehez, P. (2011). Allocation of fixed costs: characterization of the (dual) weighted Shapley value. Inter-
national Game Theory Review, 13, 141-157.
Derks, J. J., & Haller, H. H. (1999). Null players out? Linear values for games with variable supports.
International Game Theory Review, 1 (3–4), 301–314.
Derks, J., Haller, H., & Peters, H. (2000). The selectope for cooperative games. International Journal of
Game Theory, 29 (1), 23–38.
Gangolly, J. S. (1981). On joint cost allocation: Independent cost proportional scheme (ICPS) and its
properties. Journal of Accounting Research, 299–312.
Hammer, P. L., Peled, U. N., & Sorensen, S. (1977). Pseudo-boolean functions and game theory. I. Core
elements and Shapley value. Cahiers du CERO, 19, 159–176.
Harsanyi, J. C. (1959). A bargaining model for cooperative n-person games. In: A. W. Tucker & R. D.
Luce (Eds.), Contributions to the theory of games IV (325–355). Princeton NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Hart, S., & Mas-Colell, A. (1989). Potential, value, and consistency. Econometrica: Journal of the
Econometric Society, 589–614.
Kalai, E., & Samet, D. (1987). On weighted Shapley values. International Journal of Game Theory
16 (3), 205–222.
Lehrer, E. (1988). An axiomatization of the Banzhaf value. International Journal of Game Theory,
17 (2), 89–99.
Myerson, R. B. (1980) Conference Structures and Fair Allocation Rules, International Journal of Game
Theory, 9 (3), 169–182.
Moriarity, S. (1975). Another approach to allocating joint costs, The Accounting Review, 50 (4), 791–795.
Nowak, A. S., & Radzik, T. (1995). On axiomatizations of the weighted Shapley values. Games and Eco-
nomic Behavior, 8 (2), 389–405.
Radzik, T. (2012). A new look at the role of players’ weights in the weighted Shapley value. European
Journal of Operational Research, 223 (2), 407–416.
Shapley, L. S. (1953a). Additive and non-additive set functions. Princeton University.
Shapley, L. S. (1953b). A value for n-person games. H. W. Kuhn/A. W. Tucker (eds.), Contributions to
the Theory of Games, Vol. 2, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 307–317.
Shapley, L. S. (1981). Discussion comments on ”Equity considerations in traditional full cost allocation
practices: an axiomatic approach”, in: Moriarity S. (Ed.), Joint Cost Allocation, Proceeding of
the University of Oklahoma Conference on Costs Allocations, April 1981, Centre for Economic and
Management Research, University of Oklahoma, 131–136.
Vasil’ev, V. A. (1978). Support function of the core of a convex game. Optimizacija Vyp, 21, 30-35.
